When a Second Front, by Arieh Sclar

“The Soviets wished the Anglo-American combination to land sufficient combat troops on the [European] continent to drive off 40 German divisions from the Soviet front. ... Could we undertake such offensive action as would draw off 40 German divisions which would be, to tell the truth, distinctly second-rate outfits? If the answer should be in the affirmative, the war would be decided in 1942. If negative, the Soviets would fight on alone, doing their best, and no man would expect more from them than that. He had not, Mr. Molotov added, received any positive answer in London…Without in any way minimizing the risks entailed by a Second Front action this summer, Mr. Molotov declared his government wanted to know in frank terms what position we take on the question of a Second Front, and whether we were prepared to establish one. He requested a straight answer…Molotov left Washington fully expectant that the U.S. would open a Second Front in 1942…

- U.S. State Department record, November 1942

[if !supportLists]1. [endif]What did the Soviets believe would happen if a Second Front was opened in 1942? Why was Molotov asking the United States to open a Second Front?

[if !supportLists]2. [endif]What did the Americans’ eventual response to Molotov’s request indicate about the relationship among the Allies during the war? Is this evident in the above excerpt?